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We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate 
two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant, 
differences in performance by reelection-eligible and term-limited incumbents identify an 
accountability effect: reelection-eligible governors have greater incentives to exert costly effort on 
behalf of voters. Holding term-limit status constant, differences in performance by incumbents in 
different terms identify a competence effect: later-term incumbents are more likely to be competent 
both because they have survived reelection and because they have experience in office. We show that 
economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and borrowing costs are lower under reelection-
eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents (accountability), and under reelected 
incumbents than under first-term incumbents (competence), all else equal. In addition to improving our 
understanding of the role of elections in representative democracy, these findings resolve an empirical 
puzzle about the disappearance of the effect of term limits on gubernatorial performance over time. 
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Elections play two potential roles in representative democracy. First, elections may mitigate 
moral hazard by creating accountability; that is, politicians may take costly actions on behalf of voters 
because they know that they will only be reelected if their performance exceeds some standard (e.g., 
Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986). Second, elections may mitigate adverse selection by allowing voters to 
select competent types who perform better, in expectation, than an unknown challenger. Moreover, in 
the absence of term limits, elections allow voters to retain incumbents whose competence has 
increased through experience (Padro i Miquel and Snyder 2006). Thus, over time elections may help 
voters weed out bad types and retain good types (e.g., Zaller 1998; Fearon 1999; Ashworth 2005; 
Gordon, Huber, and Landa 2007; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008; Gowrisankaran, Mitchell, 
and Moro 2008).2 
Empirically distinguishing the accountability and competence effects of elections has proven 
difficult. While Fearon (1999) emphasizes a tradeoff between accountability and competence (or 
selecting good types), in many theoretical models, both effects operate in the same direction (Banks 
and Sundaram 1998; Duggan 2000; Ashworth 2005; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006; Besley 
2006). Voters’ threat to reelect only incumbents believed to be good types gives politicians an 
incentive to exert effort in order to try to convince voters that they are “good” (that is, more competent 
than they really are). For this reason, behavior by voters that alleviates adverse selection 
simultaneously alleviates moral hazard.  
We devise an empirical strategy to isolate the two effects by exploiting variation in the length 
of gubernatorial term limits. The basic argument is as follows. The relative performance of incumbents 
in the same term, some of whom are eligible to run again and some of whom are not, reflects the 
accountability effect, since each has survived the same number of elections, but has different 
incentives to take costly action on behalf of voters. The relative performance of term-limited 
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incumbents in different terms reflects the competence effect, since each has been reelected a different 
number of times but has the same incentive to take costly action on behalf of voters.   
Our data are from the American states, which have witnessed a major change in gubernatorial 
term limit laws over the last half century: the gradual shift from one-term limits to two-term limits in 
nearly one-third of the states.  During this same period, other states had two-term limits or no term 
limits.  This variation in the length of term limits across states and time allows us to compare economic 
and fiscal performance under first-term, term-limited incumbents; first-term, reelection-eligible 
incumbents; second-term, term-limited incumbents; and second-term, reelection-eligible incumbents. 
In regression models with state and year fixed effects, state time trends, and a variety of 
economic and political controls, we find that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and 
borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents, 
holding tenure in office constant (evidence of an accountability effect), and under second-term 
incumbents than under first-term incumbents, holding term-limit status constant (evidence of a 
competence effect). We find that these two effects are of comparable magnitudes.   
Empirically distinguishing the accountability and competence effects is important for several 
reasons. First, it improves our understanding of the mechanisms through which elections affect 
governance.  Second, such estimates are critical for thinking about questions of institutional design. 
For instance, knowing the magnitudes of these two effects would allow institutional designers to better 
assess whether they should focus on minimizing adverse selection or moral hazard.  Third, our 
estimates help resolve an extant puzzle in the empirical literature on term limits. Term-limited 
governors in the middle of the twentieth century taxed and spent more than governors who were 
eligible for reelection; however, this effect has gradually disappeared over time (Besley and Case 
2003). Our estimates suggest that when the states relaxed their term limit laws to allow governors to 
serve a second term in office, voters were able to use elections to weed out less competent incumbents, 
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thereby mitigating the negative accountability effect of term limits.  Finally, our particular 
identification strategy also lends some insight into ways in which term limits may affect voter welfare.  
Literature Review  
The majority of the empirical literature on the role of elections in representative democracy has 
focused primarily on moral hazard (accountability) to the exclusion of adverse selection (competence).  
For instance, a sizeable literature investigates whether members of Congress “shirk” in their final 
terms prior to retirement, where shirking is defined either in terms of reduced effort (i.e., voting less 
frequently) or ideological congruence with voters (i.e., voting more “sincerely”).  Vanbeek (1991) and 
Lott and Bronars (1993) find that retiring members vote less frequently, but do not find statistically 
significant last-period effects in the content of members’ votes, while Figlio (1995), Tien (2001), and 
Snyder and Ting (2003) find evidence that members vote more sincerely in the final term.  Similarly, 
McArthur and Marks (1988) find that, in post-election sessions, members who have not been reelected 
vote systematically differently than those who have been reelected. Ferraz and Finan (2009) investigate 
last-period effects among Brazilian mayors, and find that those who are eligible for reelection engage 
in less corruption, on average, than do term-limited mayors. 
More recently, a handful of studies have used institutional variation to separate accountability 
and competence effects. Studying a panel of countries between 1972 and 1990, Johnson and Crain 
(2004) find that the size of government has expanded more rapidly in countries with one-term limits 
than in countries with two-term limits, consistent with a competence effect.  Gordon and Huber (2007) 
find that judges in partisan competitive systems sentence more punitively than those in retention 
systems. Using variation in judges’ electoral calendars, they show that these institutional effects are 
primarily due to changes in judges’ incentives, though there is also a less pronounced effect on the 
selection of judges to office. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2009) use a combination of term limits and 
institutional randomness in wages paid to Italian mayors to disentangle accountability and competence. 
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They find that most of the increased performance associated with higher wages can be attributed to the 
selection of more competent politicians, rather than increased incentives for reelection. 
Our paper contributes to this more recent literature by using institutional variation in U.S. 
gubernatorial term limits to isolate the accountability and competence effects. In the most widely-cited 
paper on gubernatorial term limits, Besley and Case (1995a) find evidence of electoral accountability: 
in the American states between 1950 and 1986, per capita spending and taxes were higher under term-
limited governors.  However, in a 2003 paper, the authors repeat their analysis on a sample that 
extends through the mid-1990s and find that the effect of term limits has gradually disappeared over 
time.  The authors conclude that “it seems likely that some omitted variable is responsible for the 
change in behavior observed for governors working under a term limit.  This is an area ripe for future 
research” (Besley and Case 2003, 55).3   
We conjecture that the omitted variable that accounts for this puzzling result is a competence 
effect arising from variation in the length of gubernatorial term limits. In the early postwar years, the 
majority of term-limited governors served under “no succession” laws limiting them to a single term; 
today Virginia alone retains the practice.  Despite this widespread shift from one- to two-term limits, 
Besley and Case do not distinguish between term limits of different lengths. As with most other 
studies, they focus exclusively on accountability, simply including a dummy variable for term-limited 
governors in their regressions.4  
Accountability, Competence, and Term Limits: A Model of the Empirical Strategy 
The existence of accountability and competence effects in elections is well established in the 
theoretical literature (e.g., Banks and Sundaram 1998; Fearon 1999; Duggan 2000; Persson and 
Tabellini 2000; Ashworth 2005; Besley 2006; Banks and Duggan 2008; Besley and Smart 2007; 
Gordon, Huber, and Landa 2007; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008).5 As such, the purpose of 
our formal model is not to generate predictions that these effects exist. Rather, our model is intended to 
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demonstrate that, assuming these two effects exist, our empirical strategy will measure their 
magnitudes. Showing this is important because the logic of which comparisons isolate which effects is 
not always straightforward. Indeed, in some circumstances comparisons that, at an intuitive level, seem 
to isolate one effect or the other turn out not to do so.   
Given this goal, the next section provides a nontechnical overview of a simple agency model of 
elections and lists assumptions that ensure that both the accountability and competence effects exist in 
the model. We show, within the model, conditions under which term limits allow us to make 
comparisons that separately identify the magnitudes of those two effects in the data. Formal analysis 
and proofs of all results are given in the Appendix. 
The Model 
Consider an infinitely-repeated game in which there are two kinds of players: politicians and a 
representative voter. The order of play is as follows. At the beginning of each period, the incumbent 
politician chooses a level of effort . At the end of each period—after observing a policy 
outcome, but not the incumbent’s level of effort—the voter selects between two candidates (one of 
whom may be the incumbent).  
A -period term limit means that a politician can only serve in office for  periods. A politician 
is term-limited or a lame duck when she can only serve one more period. If a politician is eligible for 
reelection, she runs against a randomly selected challenger (described below). If she is term-limited, 
there is an open seat election between two randomly selected challengers.  
At the beginning of a given period, the incumbent and challenger (or two challengers) can be 
either of two types , for incompetent and competent, respectively. The probability that a 
randomly drawn politician is competent is µ0. A politician’s type is private information. 
Outcomes, for simplicity, are either good or bad. We interpret the good outcome H as the 
politician successfully managing economic or fiscal policy in a given year. We assume that 
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incompetent politicians never achieve this and that competent politicians who choose high effort do so 
with certainty, while competent politicians choosing low effort achieve H with probability , so 
that effort (or foregone rents) increases the probability of a good outcome for competent types. We 
also assume that the voter prefers an incumbent who is competent for certain but who exerts low effort 
to a randomly drawn challenger who exerts high effort, that is, . If this condition did not hold, 
the voter would always prefer a challenger and there would be no possibility of selection on 
competence in a two-term-limit system. This assumption allows us to model elections with both 
accountability and competence in the most parsimonious way.  
There may also be idiosyncratic changes in the strategic environment that cause a previously 
effective incumbent to become ineffective for reasons beyond her control. The chance that a competent 
incumbent transitions to incompetent in her tth term is εt. The transition occurs after the effort choice 
but before the outcome is determined.6  
At the beginning of the game, Nature chooses the cost of high effort, c, and makes it common 
knowledge. This cost has to be low enough, relative to the benefits of office, so that a competent 
politician would be willing to exert high effort in exchange for a promise of indefinite reelection as 
long as she remained competent. (See the upper bound on the support of the distribution of costs in the 
Appendix.) Without loss of generality, we normalize the cost of low effort to zero. For a benefit of 
reelection , the politician’s payoff from any period in which she is in office is  where 
 Politicians discount the future by δ and voters are myopic, caring only about the 
next period.  
We solve the game for pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Markov Strategies (Maskin 
and Tirole 2001), which we simply refer to as equilibria.  The solution concept requires that equilibria 
be stationary in the payoff-relevant state variables: beliefs about ability and terms remaining. We 
 7 
compare the equilibria under different term limit rules to establish counterfactuals for our empirical 
analysis.  
 Evidently, in the absence of any chance of reelection, effort imposes costs without offering any 
benefits for the politician. Thus, a politician who can only serve one term will choose  in that term. 
Hence the following result (denoted Proposition 1 in the Appendix): In the unique equilibrium of the 
game with a one-term limit, the incumbent chooses  regardless of type.  
Now suppose a politician can serve at most two terms (but that, if not reelected, can never run 
again). Just as in the one-term-limit case, it is clear that when she is term-limited in her second term, an 
incumbent will choose , regardless of type. The question is, can  be sustained in equilibrium in the 
first term?  
The voter only reelects incumbents whom he believes are likely to be competent. He updates 
his beliefs about competence after observing performance since, as shown in the appendix, better 
performance suggests that the incumbent is more likely to be competent. Thus, the benefit to the 
incumbent of effort is that it makes it more likely that she will achieve a good outcome, convince the 
voter she is competent, and thereby achieve reelection. If, however, the costs of effort are too high, the 
benefits of office are too low, or the increase in probability of providing a good outcome that is 
achieved through high effort is too low, then the politician will choose not to invest in a high level of 
effort, even in her first term. Proposition 2 in the Appendix formalizes these intuitions. In any 
equilibrium of the game with two-term limits, the voter reelects an incumbent if and only if the 
outcome is H and a first-term incumbent exerts high effort if and only if the costs of effort lie below a 
critical value (defined as a function of benefits of holding office, discounting, priors on competence, 
and the transition rate).  
This result implies that first-term outcomes are better for the voter under two-term limits than 
under one-term limits due to an accountability effect, since reelection-eligible, competent incumbents 
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exert positive effort if the cost is not too high. Moreover, expected outcomes are also better under 
second-term term-limited incumbents than under first-term term-limited incumbents due to a 
competence effect: although no term-limited incumbent has an incentive to exert high effort, only 
competent types survive the first election and, moreover, due to experience, they are less likely to 
transition away from competence.  
Finally, the absence of term limits enhances the incentive effect even further, since it provides 
the incumbent with a longer time horizon. Unlike the case with a two-term limit, the voter is now able 
to provide second- (and later-) term politicians with electoral incentives. Moreover, competence effects 
continue to operate. Proposition 3 in the Appendix solves for an equilibrium of the game with no term 
limits. Again, voters reelect if and only if the outcome is H. In each term, the incumbent chooses high 
effort if and only if the costs of effort lie below a critical value (now defined as a function of terms 
served, benefits of holding office, discounting, priors on competence, and the transition rate).  
First-term incumbents are willing to exert effort for a wider range of costs under no term limits than 
under two-term limits. This is because the benefit of winning reelection includes not only the 
immediate payoff but also the possibility of future terms when there are no term limits. Moreover, the 
cost threshold for high effort is declining with tenure in office. Hence, second-term (and later) 
incumbents are even more willing to exert effort.  
Comparisons across Systems 
Recall that only competent incumbents can achieve the outcome H and that they are certain to 
achieve this outcome if they exert effort. Given this, expected performance in any period is: 
 
Pr(Competent)[Pr(High Effort) + Pr(Low Effort)Pr(H with Low Effort)] 
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Using this formula, we can determine whether differences in expected performance across term-limit 
systems are due to differences in the probability the incumbent exerts high effort (an accountability 
effect) or differences in the probability the incumbent is competent (a competence effect). 
Table 1 summarizes results that relate to comparisons across one- and two-term-limit systems, 
which we formalize in Proposition 4 in the Appendix. The basic idea is this:  
1. Accountability Effect: The expected performance of first-term incumbents is lower in a one-
term-limit system than in a two-term-limit system.  
2. Competence Effect: The expected performance of first-term incumbents in a one-term-limit 
system is lower than the expected performance of second-term incumbents in a two-term-limit 
system.  
Since with a one-term limit no incumbent chooses to exert effort (we can think of this as the cost 
threshold being zero), the only possibility for a good outcome comes from a competent incumbent who 
does not choose to exert effort. Hence, the expected performance is:   
In the first term under a two-term limit, an incumbent will exert effort if the costs are low 
enough. Hence, expected performance is:  The extra term is positive, 
so expected performance is better in the first term of a two-term-limit system than of a one-term-limit 
system. The difference between them appears in Table 1 as the accountability effect, since the 
difference in performance between term-limited and eligible incumbents in their first term is entirely 
because the former, lacking electoral incentives, is less likely to exert effort.  
In the second term under a two-term-limit system, an incumbent will not exert effort, just as in 
the first term of a one-term-limit system. However, only competent types survive to a second term, so 
the probability that an incumbent is competent in the second term is . Expected performance is 
 Since , second-term incumbents are more likely to be competent than first-
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term incumbents. As shown in Table 1, expected performance in the second term of a two-term-limit 
system is higher than in the first term of a one-term-limit system due entirely to a competence effect.   
[Table 1 about here] 
The second set of results relates to comparisons across two-term-limit and no-term-limit 
systems, which we formalize in Proposition 5 in the appendix. The basic idea is the following:  
1. Accountability Effect: The expected performance of second-term incumbents is lower in a two-
term-limit system than in a no-term-limit system.  
2. Combined Accountability and Competence Effects: The expected performance of second-term 
incumbents in a no-term-limit system is higher than the expected performance of first-term 
incumbents in either term-limit system.  
As we have already seen, expected performance in the two-term-limit system is  In the no-
term-limit system, incumbents have the same expected ability but now have incentives to exert effort, 
so expected performance is  As recorded in Table 2, the difference between the two reflects this 
accountability effect.  
Comparing the expected performance of second-term incumbents in the no-term-limit system 
to first-term incumbents in either system is somewhat more complicated. First, consider first-term 
incumbents in the no-term-limit system. These incumbents will exert effort but, since they have not 
survived a round of reelection, their expected ability (which, here, equals expected performance) is 
only . Hence, the difference between second-term incumbents and first-term incumbents 
within a no-term-limit system is due entirely to a competence effect (as reported in Table 2).  
Now consider first-term incumbents in the two-term-limit system. These incumbents are also of 
expected ability . Moreover, since they can only stand for reelection once, they have weaker 
incentives to exert effort (only doing so if the costs are below the threshold ). Hence, their expected 
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performance is . Given this, the difference between the performance of 
second-term incumbents in a no-term-limit system and first-term incumbents in a two-term-limit 
system reflects a combination of accountability and competence effects (as reported in Table 2) 
[Table 2 about here] 
It is worth noting that what we have called the competence effect actually consists of two 
analytically distinct components—selection and experience. Later-term incumbents are more 
competent than earlier-term incumbents for two reasons: reelection weeds out incompetent types and 
the more experience an incumbent has, the more likely she is to remain competent in the face of 
stochastic elements of the political environment. Our results suggest an empirical strategy for 
estimating the accountability and competence effects, but not for disaggregating the competence effect 
into its constituent parts.  
Data and Methodology 
Propositions 4 and 5 suggest an empirical strategy for estimating our quantities of interest, the 
magnitudes of the accountability and competence effects of elections.  We use panel data from the 
American states.7  The sample period is 1950-2000 unless otherwise noted.  We adopt a specification 
similar to those of Besley and Case (1995a), Besley and Case (2003), and Besley (2006) to show how 
our results relate to theirs. All monetary values are reported in constant 1982 dollars.   
Dependent Variables 
In the existing political agency literature (e.g. Besley and Case 1995a, Persson and Tabellini 
2000), incumbents who exert more effort provide services to their constituents at lower cost, as 
measured by the size of the public sector.  This idea is consistent with the empirical finding that voters 
are “fiscal conservatives” and punish incumbent governors for rapid spending and tax growth (e.g. 
Peltzman 1992, Besley and Case 1995b).  In order to integrate our study with this literature, we use the 
log of per capita spending and the log of per capita taxes as dependent variables.  The former captures 
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the overall size of the public sector while the latter captures what is arguably the most visible and least 
politically popular way in which governments raise revenue.  Since tax revenue excludes federal 
grants, user charges, and other non-tax forms of government income, it is quite distinct from and 
considerably smaller than total expenditures, as shown in Table 3.8 
In addition to following the existing literature in using these two measures, we propose two 
additional measures of incumbent performance. The first is the state’s financial condition, as measured 
by relative yield spreads on 20-year general obligation debt.9  A higher yield spread increases the cost 
of borrowing and can reflect rising debt, poor economic performance, mismanagement, corruption, and 
other factors that bear on the state’s ability to make its debt service payments (Lowry and Alt 2001). 
Since higher interest costs translate into higher general fund expenditures that provide no public 
benefits, they represent poor performance that could affect re-election prospects. 
Our second additional measure is the state’s economic growth rate relative to the national 
average. Studies of gubernatorial elections and job approval ratings suggest that voters value and 
respond to growth (Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998) and, in particular, that voters evaluate their governors 
based on their state’s economic performance relative to the performance of the national economy (see 
for example Wolfers 2002).  Data on state economic growth are from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Descriptive statistics for all four dependent variables 
appear in Table 3.10 
[Table 3 about here] 
Independent Variables and Controls 
Our main independent variables of interest are dummies for the tenure and term limit status of 
the incumbent governor. We distinguish “lame ducks” who cannot run for re-election from “eligibles” 
who can, according to whether they are serving in their “first term” or “second term.” 
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We also include a variety of economic and political controls. Like Besley and Case (1995a, 
2003), we control for variables that might be expected to affect economic policy outcomes, namely: 
population, per capita state income, and the proportions of elderly (65+) and school-aged (5-17) in the 
population.  In addition, we follow Alt and Lowry (2000) and Besley (2006) in controlling for the 
party composition of government, including dummies for Democratic governor, Democratic house, 
Democratic senate, and divided government, as well as a folded index of legislative party competition 
(i.e. the absolute value of deviations from 50 percent Democratic control) in each chamber.   
The term-limit regime determines the number of terms a successful candidate could serve and 
thus potentially the value of office. A change in the term-limit regime could therefore affect the 
average competence of candidates. In that case we confound the competence effects of term limits with 
pre-existing differences in average quality. In order to control for this possibility, we include a variable 
reflecting the governor’s years of political experience prior to becoming governor, which is a standard 
proxy for a politician's quality, measured at the time of entering office (Bond et al. 1985; Jacobson 
1989; Van Dunk 1997; Hall and Bonneau 2006).11   
Finally, we include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends to 
address any remaining unobserved heterogeneity. Adding state-specific time trends allows “treatment” 
and “control” states to follow different trends, helping to soak up residual variance attributable to 
unobservable, time-variant state characteristics (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
Comparing One-Term and Two-Term Limit Systems 
 
The quantities of interest are the magnitudes of the accountability and competence effects. Our 
first empirical specification estimates these effects—as suggested by Proposition 4—by running the 
following regression on the sample of states that changed from one- to two-term limits: 
 
performanceit = α1 first-term-eligibleit + α2 second-term-lame-duckit + α3 Xit + θi + δt +  υit 
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where performance is as defined above (alternately: log of per capita spending, log of per capita taxes, 
borrowing costs, and economic growth), Xit are control variables (including state-specific time 
trends), θi are state fixed effects, δt are year fixed effects, and υit is an error term. This sample of states 
is disproportionately Southern; we address this issue with a robustness test later in the paper. 
The omitted category is first-term lame ducks.  As in Table 1, it follows that α1, the coefficient 
on first-term-eligible, provides an estimate of the accountability effect, since it compares the 
performance of first-term eligibles to that of first-term lame ducks. In terms of the formal model 
summarized in Table 1, α1 estimates the quantity .  The coefficient on second-term-
lame-duck, α2, provides an estimate of the competence effect, since it compares reelected lame ducks to 
first-term lame ducks. Since performance is expected to be worst under first-term lame ducks, we 
expect both of these coefficients to be negative for spending, taxes, and borrowing costs and positive 
for economic growth.   
 The odd-numbered columns of Table 4 report the results of these regressions. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  The first and third columns show that per capita spending and taxes 
are three to five percent lower under both first-term eligible governors and second-term lame ducks 
than under first-term lame ducks, supporting the accountability and competence effects, respectively. 
This difference, the estimated effect of elections, is of a similar magnitude (but opposite in sign) to the 
difference made by having a Democratic majority in the state legislature. Column 5 shows that 
borrowing costs are six to seven basis points lower under both first-term eligible governors and 
second-term lame ducks, compared to first-term lame ducks. This is similar to the effect of an extra 
$300 to $400 in real state per capita income. As shown in column 7, the economic growth rate is nearly 
0.7 percentage points higher (about a quarter of the average growth rate) under first-term reelection-
eligible governors than under first-term lame ducks, reflecting the accountability effect; the positive 
coefficient on the competence effect goes in the expected direction but falls short of statistical 
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significance at conventional levels. These are, on the whole, both substantively and statistically 
significant effects.  
It is worth noting that, in all four cases, the competence and accountability effects are of 
approximately the same size; in no case does a statistical test reject the hypothesis of equal magnitudes 
at conventional levels of significance. This fact should not be interpreted to mean that, in some general 
sense, competence and accountability are of equal importance for the quality of governance. We are 
estimating the size of a particular accountability effect and a particular competence effect in a 
particular electoral setting. However, the similarity of the magnitudes in these data is important 
because it suggests that, by focusing on both accountability and competence, our findings can resolve 
an extant empirical puzzle.  
 [Table 4 about here] 
Resolving an Empirical Puzzle 
 
As described in the literature review, Besley and Case (1995a) find that per capita taxes and 
spending were higher under term-limited governors than under eligible governors between 1950 and 
1986. However, in a 2003 paper the authors find that the effect of term limits on spending and taxes 
displays a marked downward trend over the past fifty years. Besley and Case do not distinguish first- 
and second-term lame ducks; their regression models include a dummy variable for all governors who 
cannot run for reelection. They conjecture that some unobserved factor has altered gubernatorial 
behavior over time.  
Our results suggest that the changing effect of gubernatorial term limits reflects changes in 
governors’ competence rather than their behavior. As states have gradually switched from one- to two-
term limits, voters have increasingly been able to use elections to weed out low-quality incumbents and 
incumbents have had increased scope for on-the-job learning. As average tenure has increased, 
performance by term-limited governors has increasingly reflected the effect of greater incumbent 
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competence, offsetting the effect of lower effort over time.  Since the estimated competence effect is 
roughly the same size as the accountability effect, the shift from one- to two-term limits made it appear 
as though the impact of term limits was declining to zero. 
Robustness Tests 
As noted above, a possible source of heterogeneity in our empirical specification is that the 
pool of candidates may change as a result of the relaxation of term limit laws. In particular, one-term 
limits may do more to dissuade competent candidates from seeking office than two-term limits. If this 
is the case, we would be overestimating the size of the competence effect, since we would also be 
picking up an improvement in the quality of the candidates. We do control for the incumbent’s prior 
political experience to attempt to address this possibility. It is worth noting that while the average 
amount of prior experience does increase in the pool of candidates following the switch from one- to 
two-term limits, the estimated effect is small—an increase of slightly less than two years—and does 
not rise to conventional levels of statistical significance.   
A second potential endogeneity problem arises from the timing of the transition from one- to 
two-term limits, which may reflect voters' feelings about the incumbent who was in office at that time.  
The direction of the potential bias is not clear, a priori, as a state might abandon one-term limits either 
in order to allow a highly competent politician to run for reelection or as a result of heightened concern 
about incumbent shirking.  Many states that switched from one- to two-term limits designed their laws 
to allow the current incumbent to run for reelection, and in most of those states the incumbent went on 
to win reelection, suggesting that the bias might be working in the same direction as our results.  That 
is, a highly competent governor who, in the absence of the term limit reform, would have been coded 
as a first-term lame duck is instead coded as a first-term eligible governor, making the average 
performance of first-term lame ducks appear relatively worse than if the reform had been exogenous.  
However, in other states, the current incumbent was either explicitly prohibited from running for 
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reelection or was permitted to run but did not win, suggesting that endogeneity bias might be working 
in the opposite direction.  
 To address this potential bias, we conducted a robustness test in which we omitted from the 
sample the incumbent who was in office at the time of the policy change. The results of this robustness 
test are shown in the even-numbered columns of Table 4.  Our results hold up well: in one case (taxes) 
the estimates are more or less unchanged, while in the other three cases the estimates become larger in 
magnitude, more precise, or both. The competence effect in the growth regression is now statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
Another potential threat to our empirical strategy arises from the fact that a disproportionate 
number of the states that switched from one- to two-term limits are located in the South.  Thus, we 
may be accidentally picking up a “South” effect rather than (or in addition to) the term limit effect.  
Our control variables do capture some of the most notable Southern trends over the past fifty years—
namely, increased party competitiveness, a declining share of Democratic governors and legislators, 
and rising incomes, and our state fixed effects, year effects, and state-specific time trends help to 
absorb some of the residual variation.  These controls are not a panacea, of course, so as a robustness 
test we investigate whether our results differ for the Southern and non-Southern states in the sample. 
When we interact our term-limit dummy variables with a dummy for Southern states, we find that none 
of the results are statistically significantly different for the two sets of states with the exception of the 
coefficient on “second-term lame duck” in the borrowing-cost regression.12 
Comparing Two-Term to No Term Limits 
Our second empirical specification compares states with two-term limits to those with no term 
limits.  According to Proposition 5, second-term eligible governors should perform better than both 
first-term eligible governors (due to a combination of competence and accountability) and second-term 
lame ducks (due to accountability). We include in our sample only those states that had either no term 
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limits or two-term limits during the entire sample period. This allows us to avoid problems with the 
specification used by Besley and Case (1995a; 2003), in which the estimate of an accountability effect 
is biased by potentially attributing to it not only the competence effects resulting from the switch from 
one- to two-term limits in many states but also changes in the sample resulting from the adoption of 
two-term limits by states that previously did not have any term limits.13  
 We run the following regression: 
 
performanceit = β1 first-term-eligibleit + β2 second-term-lame-duckit + β3 Xit + θi + δt +  υit 
 
The omitted category is second-term governors who are eligible for reelection.14  Because the omitted 
category is different than in the previous specification, the interpretation of coefficients is also 
different.  The coefficient on first-term-eligible (β1) now provides an estimate of a combination of 
competence and some accountability, since it compares first- to second-term eligible incumbents. The 
coefficient on second-term-lame-duck (β2) provides an estimate of the accountability effect, since it 
compares second-term lame ducks to second-term eligible incumbents.15  Since performance is 
expected to be worse under both of these types of governors than under second-term eligibles, we 
expect the coefficients to be of the opposite signs as in the previous regression: positive for spending, 
taxes, and borrowing costs and negative for economic growth.  The dependent variables and control 
variables are the same as in the previous specification and, as before, we control for state-specific time 
trends, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Column 1 reveals that per capita spending is nearly three percent higher under first-term 
eligible governors than under second-term eligible governors, who have survived reelection and have 
more experience (competence) as well as stronger incentives to exert effort (accountability), all of 
which pull in the same direction. The coefficient on second-term lame duck (accountability) has the 
expected sign but falls short of statistical significance.  Column 3 shows that per capita taxes are three 
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percent higher under second-term lame ducks than under second-term eligible governors 
(accountability), and more than four percent higher under first-term eligible governors than under 
second-term eligible governors (competence and accountability).     
Column 5 shows that borrowing costs are about 12.2 basis points higher under second-term 
lame ducks than under second-term eligible governors (accountability) and about 10.9 basis points 
higher under first-term eligible governors than under second-term eligible governors (competence and 
accountability).  In the economic growth regression (column 7), the coefficients have the expected 
signs but fall short of statistical significance at conventional levels. 
 In the even-numbered columns of Table 5 we separately estimate the performance of first-term 
governors who won reelection and those who lost or withdrew. As a basic test of the plausibility of our 
account, we expect first-term governors who won reelection to have performed better than those who 
were not reelected. The coefficient on first-term eligible captures the performance of first-term eligible 
winners relative to second-term eligible governors. The coefficient on first-term eligible non-winner 
captures the performance of the non-winners relative to the winners (thus, the total effect for non-
winners is the sum of these two coefficients).   
We find, as expected, that governors who won reelection performed better than governors who 
did not win reelection. Columns 4 and 8 reveal that per capita taxes are two and a half percent higher, 
and economic growth is nearly 0.7 percentage points lower, under non-winners than under winners.  
However, we do not find statistically significant differences between winners and losers in either 
spending or borrowing costs.    
Conclusions 
 This paper attempts to shed light on the role of elections in representative democracy, using an 
agency model of elections that encompasses the effects of both moral hazard or “accountability” 
(voters’ ability to induce politicians to take costly actions) and adverse selection or “competence” 
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(voters’ ability to select “good types”). We incorporate term limits of varying lengths into the model 
and use it to map out an empirical strategy that treats variation in the length of term limits as a natural 
experiment. This allows us to extract the information necessary to disentangle accountability from 
competence in a common set of elections. While both of these effects have long existed in theory, this 
paper is among the first to empirically estimate the size of each of these effects separately.  
 Our empirical findings suggest that both accountability and competence play important roles in 
elections. First, we have found evidence of an accountability effect: per capita taxes, per capita 
spending, and borrowing costs are higher and economic growth is lower under term-limited 
incumbents than under those who are eligible for reelection, controlling for tenure in office. Second, 
we have found that performance improves with the incumbent’s tenure in office. Per capita taxes, per 
capita spending, and borrowing costs are lower and economic growth is higher under second-term 
incumbents than under first-term incumbents, controlling for term-limit status.  This is consistent with 
differences in competence that result from both electoral selection and experience in office. These 
effects were estimated most consistently when comparing one-term and two-term limit regimes.  
Comparisons of states with and without two-term limits further confirm the existence and scale of the 
two effects.  We found the magnitudes of the accountability and competence effects to be similar to 
each other, resolving a puzzle about the changing effect of gubernatorial term limits over time.   
Our finding of a sizeable competence effect suggests an important direction for future research: 
empirically disentangling the components of competence into electoral selection, the process by which 
bad incumbents are weeded out over time, and experience, the increase in competence that comes with 
serving in office.  The key constraint in our approach that prevented us from doing so is that one 
cannot become an experienced governor without having survived reelection, so selection and 
experience are confounded. One way to drive a wedge between inherent ability and experience is to 
compare winners to losers within a given term (as we did in Table 5) since within a term there is no 
 21 
experience effect. However, since competent types exert higher effort in the theoretical model, this 
comparison conflates inherent ability (i.e., selection) and accountability. If one could find a set of 
elections in which incumbents were surprised by the opportunity to run again (e.g., due to court 
decisions striking down term limit laws), then it might be possible to empirically separate selection 
from both experience and accountability.  
Our findings also have implications for the normative debate on term limits.  Opponents often 
argue that term limits not only cause incumbents to shirk but also interfere with voters’ ability to 
choose the best-qualified representatives. Our results suggest that concerns about competence are 
relevant, and that the length, not just the existence, of term limits matters.  Ultimately, the debate over 
term limits entails weighing these disadvantages against the potential advantages, such as limiting 
opportunism (e.g. Smart and Sturm 2006) and reducing the incumbency advantage. We do not claim to 
settle this debate, but rather to clarify why and how some of these effects arise and to estimate their 
magnitudes.  Our results may also help inform analyses (e.g. Snyder and Ting 2008) of why voters and 
interest groups take the positions they do on term limits. 
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Appendix 
The probability of H is given by and  Recall the 
following from the main text. First,  Second, the cost is drawn from an absolutely 
continuous, increasing cumulative distribution function, F, with associated density function f whose 
support is  with  We normalize the cost of low effort to zero.  
Let  be the voter’s posterior belief that the incumbent will be competent in her tth 
term, given the outcome O in her t-1th term, the voter belief that the politician’s action in her t-1th term 
was , and the voter belief that the incumbent was competent in her t-1th term  with probability :  
 
 We write equilibrium for pure strategy PBE in Markov Strategies (Maskin and Tirole 2001).  
Proposition 1.  In the unique equilibrium of the game with a one term limit, any incumbent chooses .  
Proof. For all types, the payoff from high effort is B – c and the payoff from low effort is B.■  
Proposition 2.  Let . In any equilibrium of the game with two-term limits: 
• If , first-term incumbents choose if competent and  if incompetent; all second-term 
incumbents choose . A second-term incumbent is competent with probability . 
• If , both first- and second-term incumbents choose , regardless of type. The probability 
that a second-term incumbent is the competent type is .  
• The voter reelects first-term incumbents if and only if the outcome is H. 
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Proof.  In any equilibrium incompetent types choose low effort in every period, since outcomes are 
unresponsive to action. In the second term, the incumbent will choose low effort even if competent, 
since there is no reelection. Now, consider voter behavior when faced with a first-term incumbent.  
Lemma 1.  In any equilibrium of the game with two-term limits, the voter reelects a first-term 
incumbent following an outcome of  and does not reelect following an outcome of .  
Proof. If the voter expects high effort from first-term competent types, then the voter reelects if 
 Following outcome H,  so the voter reelects since 
. Following the outcome L the voter is certain the incumbent is incompetent, so does not reelect.  
Now suppose the voter expects low effort from competent types in the first term. Then the 
voter reelect the incumbent when his posterior beliefs are  if  The voter will reelect 
following , since his beliefs are . Following , the voter’s beliefs are 
 so the voter will not reelect. ■ 
Now consider first-term effort by competent types.  
Case 1:    
From Lemma 1 the expected payoff to a competent type from  in the first term is 
while the payoff from  is  Competent types choose  in the first 
term if which is confirmed by the hypothesis of this case. Since incompetent 
types are never reelected, the probability that second-term incumbents are competent is  
Case 2:  
An argument identical to the one above shows that there is an equilibrium where first-period effort is 
 and that there is no equilibrium where first-period effort is . Again, by Lemma 1, incompetent 
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types are never reelected, so the probability that second-term incumbents are competent is  The 
equilibrium is not unique because of the measure zero case where , making the 
first-term incumbent is indifferent. Whatever the incumbent does in this case, in any equilibrium play 
is as described in the proposition whenever  ■ 
Proposition 3 There is an infinite, increasing sequence   satisfying for all t, such 
that in any equilibrium of the game with no term limits  tth term competent incumbents choose  if 
incompetent incumbents choose  in any term, the voter reelects if and only if the outcome is H.  
In such an equilibrium, the probability that a tth-term incumbent is competent is . 
Proof. Consider the following strategy profile and belief system: Competent incumbents choose . 
Incompetent incumbents choose . The voter reelects if and only if his posterior beliefs are greater 
than  After outcome H in an incumbent’s tth term, the voter believes the incumbent is 
competent with probability  After outcome L the voter is certain the incumbent is incompetent. 
Given politician strategies, competent types succeed and incompetent types fail. Competent 
types transition with probability   so voter beliefs are consistent. Since outcomes (and thus voter 
beliefs and reelection decisions) are not sensitive to effort, incompetent types optimally choose .   
A competent type gets payoff  in her 
tth term if she follows the strategy. A one shot deviation to  yields expected 
payoff . There is no profitable if 
  is minimized at t = 1 and , so  for all t. 
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 Given politician strategies, the voter’s payoff from reelection is the probability the incumbent is 
competent. His payoff from not reelecting is so his strategy is sequentially rational. 
 For uniqueness. the argument above shows that incompetent types cannot exert effort in 
equilibrium. The only possibility is for competent types not to exert effort. Notice, however, if all types 
choose low effort, then the voter’s beliefs and strategy must be exactly as in the proposition. But, then, 
the argument above establishes that sequential rationality requires competent types to exert effort. ■ 
Proposition 4.  
1. The expected performance of first-term incumbents in a one-term-limit system is lower than in 
a two-term-limit system, due entirely to differences in effort.  
2. The expected performance of first-term incumbents in a one-term-limit system is lower than the 
expected performance of second-term incumbents in a two-term-limit system, due entirely to 
differences in expected competence.  
Proof.  
1. From Proposition 1 in a one-term-limit system effort is , expected ability is , and so 
expected performance is  From Proposition 2, effort by a first-term incumbent in a 
two-term limit system is  if , expected ability is , and so expected performance 
is   
2. From Proposition 2, effort by a second-term lame duck is , expected ability is , and so 
expected performance is  ■ 
Proposition 5.  
1. The expected performance of second-term incumbents in a two-term-limit system is lower than 
in a no-term-limit system, due entirely to differences in effort.  
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2. The expected performance of second-term incumbents in the no-term-limit system is higher 
than the expected performance of first-term incumbents in either term limit system. Comparing 
to no term limits, the difference is due entirely to differences in effort. Comparing to two-term 
limits, the difference is due to difference in effort and expected ability. 
Proof.  
From Proposition 3, effort by a second-term incumbents in a no-term-limit system is , expected 
ability is , so  expected performance is  
1. From Proposition 2, effort by a second-term lame duck is , expected ability is , and so 
expected performance   
2. From Proposition 3, effort by a first-term incumbent in a no-term-limit system is , expected 
ability is , so  expected performance is  From Proposition 2, effort 
by a first-term incumbent in a two-term limit system is  if , expected ability is 
, and so expected performance is To show an 
effort difference in addition to an expected competence difference, it suffices to show  
This follows from: 
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Table 1. Comparing Systems with One- and Two-Term Limits 
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equilibria of a repeated model of elections with moral hazard and adverse selection in which voters do 
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10 In addition, we considered using several other dependent variables, including consumer confidence 
and voter approval ratings. However, historical state-level consumer confidence data are not available, 
and approval data (e.g. Beyle et al. 2002) do not go back far enough to encompass the transition from 
one-term to two-term limits.  
11 We return to this issue in the robustness-test section of the paper and find that, in fact, the switch 
from one- to two-term limits is not associated with a significant increase in the incumbent’s political 
experience. 
12 We define the South as including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina. We exclude Florida and Tennessee because they are usually considered 
part of the “peripheral South” (Matthews and Prothro 1962).  
13 Many states that switched from no term limits to two-term limits during the sample period had two- 
rather than four-year gubernatorial terms prior to the adoption of term limits, potentially confounding 
estimates of the effects of term limits. To include Maryland and Ohio, which adopted two-term limits 
in the 1950s, our sample begins in 1960. We find similar results for the sample beginning in 1950 and 
excluding these two states.   
14 It also includes a handful of governors in their third term or higher.  All results are robust to 
excluding these governors. 
15 Although β1 estimates competence plus accountability and β2 estimates pure accountability, β2 - β1 
does not estimate pure competence, because the size of the accountability component in β1 is not 
expected to be the same as the size of the accountability effect measured by β2. See Table 2. 
